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Asking the companies about the most typical way they will be compromised, most answer this that it will be an inside employee. ★ In earlier days ICS where standalone systems and protocols where most of the time proprietary. There was less ICS security awareness needed, protocols were hard to understand but most important because systems were never or almost never connected to the internet. ★
Attacks on information systems: Once upon a time, there were information systems that were not intentionally attacked, because nobody knew how to attack them. Then the first practical information system was implemented. Systems have faults, faults may lead to failures. ★ Insiders – those with legitimate access and authority – are often cited as the most damaging information-related threat. But how do insiders turn bad, and what can be done about them? ★ How do we "measure" security? ★ What about the basis for trust? Organizational trust? More specifically, "Trust for what?". ★. Hackers like insiders can compromise a seemingly unimportant system to access the network and use it as a launching pad for attacks on other systems and many people would be none the wiser because they don't have the proper controls to prevent and detect malicious use.
Knowledge is needed to develop malware to infect and impact industrial control systems. ★ Malware developers need to acquire certain knowledge to launch a targeted attack on an ICS. If an attacker wants to impact the security of the ICS with malware, he needs to infect the ICS first. This requires knowledge about what Operating Systems (OSs) (e.g., Windows, Linux) need to be infected. One or more exploits compatible with the OS are needed to infect the targeted machines. Knowledge about the OS version is needed, depending on the vulnerabilities that the exploits target. If the target is not connected to the internet (i.e., completely air-gapped) then an attack scenario corresponding exploits is needed (e.g., a scenario where the malware infects USB-drives). Knowledge about firewalls and their rules will enable the attacker to develop malware that can spread and scan through networks withouting being blocked. The attacker should know a (unique) property of the target for the malware to detect if it has reached its target. ★
- Financial - Multinationals - Telecom - Water - Nuclear - Energy - Harbour - Airport - Managed Service Providers - Health - Insurance
★
In the past, Operational Technology was typically comprised of multiple standalone systems. ★ Precision control systems used for calibrating industrial machinery, for example, had no need to communicate with those that might manage the flow of essential components onto an assembly line. Typically, none of these technologies were expected to cross the functional barrier separating OT from traditional IT, or to be joined to enterprise networks in order to share either data or systems access with any of the usual corporate information systems. From IT’s perspective, these systems were effectively off-limits. They were managed by subject-matter-experts at the shop floor level. From OT’s perspective, this was a status quo that could be easily accepted. It kept things simpler and more tightly under their control for Operations personnel to manage their own technological backyard.
Insider threat tactics: The hacker speaks by Priscilla
· Priscilla Felicia Harmanus · 1993 from the Netherlands · Last update: 21 august 2020
How I discovered Free Software and met RMS ★
How To Install Proprietary Closed Software In Ubuntu ★
Your Grandma on linux - explain
No one knows who I am yet and what kind
of content I produce. So why not focus on a topic that
people are already searching for, right?
Home » Research » About » IT vs OT | When Facing The Insider Threat | What Happend | Free Software vs Open Source | ask me |
Waar de fysieke en digitale wereld samenkomen | Where the physical and digital world come together | |
Dat onze afhankelijkheid van het internet ook risico’s oplevert is u wel bekend. Deze cyber dreigingen raken niet alleen onze kantoorautomatisering, maar ook de industriële automatiseringssystemen. Zo ondersteunt VKA Rijkswaterstaat bij het veilig houden van haar bruggen, tunnels en sluizen. Maar deze dreigingen gelden ook in vele andere bedrijfstakken, zoals voor (massa)productiebedrijven en ziekenhuizen. VKA's ervaringen op dit terrein hebben zij verwerkt in deze praatplaat die u kunt gebruiken om cybersecurity binnen uw organisatie te bespreken. | THIS IS A NEW WEB PAGE | We know that our dependence on the internet also creates risks. These cyber threats not only affect our office automation, but also the industrial automation systems (ICS / SCADA). For example, VKA supports Rijkswaterstaat in keeping its bridges, tunnels and sluices safe. But these threats also apply in many other industries, such as (mass) production companies and hospitals. VKA has incorporated their experiences in this area into this SCADA Cybersecurity Poster that you can use to discuss cybersecurity within your organization. |
Information Technology vs. Operational Technology
Where the physical and digital world come together
Differences between IT and OT environments
Traditionally, OT and IT networks have historically been kept separate.
For a long time, SCADA systems were protected with obscurity and isolation. The systems were not connected to the Internet and the console commands were difficult for hackers to manipulate. However, with increasing proliferation of networking and development of GUI command and control environment, it has become much easier for hackers to penetrate into the once secure SCADA world and to disrupt and disable the operation of expensive equipment causing huge losses to the industry. The hackers can attack SCADA system to obtain access to SCADA master control station, compromise RTU (Remote Terminal Unit) or local PLC (Programmable Logic Controller), spoof RTU and send incorrect data to master control station, shutdown RTU and modify RTU control program [1]. The losses caused by such intrusions run into millions of dollars with potential health and safety hazards for large populations. Therefore, it has become increasingly important to provide security to the SCADA systems.
Open source software has been established as a viable alternative to the commercial software through the efforts of thousands of volunteers coordinating the development work through Internet communications. Most of the open source software uses the well tested Linux platform and released under GNU public license. Several security tools have been developed with open license
Linux evolved in a completely different way. From nearly the beginning, it was rather casually hacked on by huge numbers of volunteers coordinating only through the Internet. Quality was maintained not by rigid standards or autocracy but by the naively simple strategy of releasing every week and getting feedback from hundreds of users within days, creating a sort of rapid Darwinian selection on the mutations introduced by developers. To the amazement of almost everyone, this worked quite well.
Automation will permeate everywhere. Linux, by its very nature, has the opportunity to dominate universal automation. Over the long run, the evolutionary track of software created by interested users is stronger because any software survives according to the degree it fits into its ecological niche. Linux consumers build Linux. As long as the community can sustain sufficient self-organization, adaptive success is guaranteed. The ecological strategy of proprietary vendors is far different. These vendors try hard to adapt their products into ecological contexts they control, manipulating the consumer by positive marketing as well as by more disingenuous tactics. While carefully reading the tea leaves of user preferences, they cook the leaves with calculated marketing campaigns.
How does Linux lose against the interests of these proprietary vendors? One good way to fail is to lose touch with the very community Linux is being built for and by. This effect can be discerned in the disorganization brought about by disrespect and infighting amongst key groups and individuals of the open source and free software communities. Self-interest leads to survival, but out of balance only narrows the relevance of Linux and may even lead to its downfall. As often as not, the Linux community is its own worst enemy.
The combination of zero royalties and low hardware costs enable the prerequisite infrastructure of large projects to be built cost effectively. Furthermore, maintenance and upgrade costs can be controlled by the project more efficiently. While software evolution is more rapid under Linux than under commercial operating systems, each project nonetheless can select the upgrades and maintenance which are appropriate to its own specific requirements without arbitrary vendor upgrades and artificial external costs. Support cannot be withdrawn because a complete snapshot of the source code used for the project is always available.
For example, many large-scale projects exist which have been developed in the public domain but which are tied to a proprietary infrastructure. In one such case, the U.S. Weather Service has built a large, public domain source system for weather forecasting based upon Hewlett Packard's (HP) proprietary Unix operating system and compilers. The costs of implementing a national-scale forecasting system on high-priced HP equipment would be prohibitive to all but the wealthiest countries. However, with some effort, the entire code base could be converted to Linux and built using standard open compilers such as g . Several template facilities might need to be reworked against the template limitations of g , and data byte order assumptions embedded in some parts of the code must be resolved, but in theory such a conversion could be completed successfully. Then a top-rate automated weather tracking and early-warning system could be implemented wherever raw data could be obtained to feed the forecasting software. Although obtaining raw weather data is not trivial, literally hundreds of programmer-years worth of work on a world-class front-end weather system already has been provided. Once available under Linux, modern weather forecasting services could begin to become available to developing nations worldwide.
Product development also benefits from the same factors. Any number of commercial products can be built without the traditional dependencies on external licensing and support. The control of Linux-based software products can be fully vested in the project itself. Projects can be jump started with fewer legal and financial dependencies. New products can be built by virtually any source in the global development community and can compete on technical merit with few licensing constraints and no royalty encumbrances. Some examples might be a Linux version of the popular modem multiplexers such as Webramp, or Linux-based PDAs, office Intranet and file servers, etc. Linux is highly suited for building any software or firmware product that is service oriented and capable of being remotely, especially Web managed.
But can product developers basing their work on GNU Public License (GPL) open source software such as Linux still protect their valuable intellectual property, their inventions? If they have incorporated GPL source software, then they typically must provide their own product's source code also. In some cases this will not be a problem. Where it is, then the developer should build their product using dynamic libraries if possible. If dynamic libraries are not sufficient, then alternative open source software, such as FreeBSD, could be used as a basis for their product. However, hoarding inventions contradicts the spirit as well as the many advantages of Linux and open source software. While fully adhering to open source practice, vendors such as Red Hat have implemented a business model that emphasizes other product differentiators including packaging, ease of use, configuration utilities, and service, etc. Large projects can greatly benefit from open source practice since they are normally sold based on expertise and long-term maintainability. When the complete project source code is available, the lifecycle stability of the entire project is enhanced.
Insider threat tactics: The hacker speaks by Priscilla
· Priscilla Felicia Harmanus · 1993 from the Netherlands · Last update: 14 juli 2020
How I discovered Free Software and met RMS
How To Install Proprietary Closed Software In Ubuntu
Your Grandma on linux - explain
No one knows who I am yet and what kind
of content I produce. So why not focus a topic that
people are already searching for, right?
Do you know the signs of suspicious activity? Find out. Recognizing and Dealing With Suspicious Behavior
Home » Research » About » IT vs OT | When Facing The Insider Threat | What Happend | Free Software vs Open Source | ask me |
Insider Threat - an overview | ScienceDirect Topics
Insider Attack - an overview | ScienceDirect Topics
Anomaly Detection - an overview | ScienceDirect Topics
Classification of Security Threats in Information Systems
Detect Anomaly - an overview | ScienceDirect Topics
Insider Attacker - an overview | ScienceDirect Topics
Handbook on Securing Cyber-Physical Critical Infrastructure | ScienceDirect
Internal Attack - an overview | ScienceDirect Topics
Malicious Attack - an overview | ScienceDirect Topics
Backup Generator - an overview | ScienceDirect Topics
Proprietary System - an overview | ScienceDirect Topics
Electric Grids - an overview | ScienceDirect Topics
Securing the Smart Grid | ScienceDirect
Attacking Smart Meters - ScienceDirect
Open-Source Security Testing Methodology Manual - an overview | ScienceDirect Topics
Open Source License - an overview | ScienceDirect Topics
Practical Open Source Software for Libraries | ScienceDirect
Malicious Input - an overview | ScienceDirect Topics
Operating System Command - an overview | ScienceDirect Topics
Temporary Internet File - an overview | ScienceDirect Topics
Obfuscation Technique - an overview | ScienceDirect Topics
Electronic Control Unit - an overview | ScienceDirect Topics
Handbook on Securing Cyber-Physical Critical Infrastructure | ScienceDirect
Activex Control - an overview | ScienceDirect Topics
Wireless Access Point - an overview | ScienceDirect Topics
Hacking Wireless Access Points | ScienceDirect
The Basics of Web Hacking | ScienceDirect
Hardware Security | ScienceDirect
Electronics Supply Chain - ScienceDirect
Computers as Components | ScienceDirect
Hacking Wireless Access Points: Governmental Context - ScienceDirect
Internet of Things | ScienceDirect
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The Luxury of Ignorance: Part Deux
Terminology Wars: A Web Content Analysis
bondage-and-discipline language
OSI Position Paper on the SCO-vs.-IBM Complaint
www.catb.org/jargon/oldversions/jarg447.txt
The Lost Art of Structure Packing
TV Typewriters: A Tale of Hackish Ingenuity
Frequently Asked Questions about the Glider Emblem
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www.catb.org/esr/jargon/oldversions/jarg241.txt
www.catb.org/esr/jargon/oldversions/jarg251.txt
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The Halloween Documents: An Appreciation
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Traditionally, OT and IT networks have historically been kept separate GOOGLE SEARCH!.
Vroeger waren ICS standalone systemen. En protocollen waren meestal gepatenteerd. Er was minder ICS-beveiligingsbewustzijn nodig. Omdat deze protocollen moeilijk te begrijpen waren, maar belangrijker omdat systemen nooit of bijna nooit met internet waren verbonden. De laatste jaren zijn steeds meer ICS internet ready en ook daadwerkelijk verbonden met internet. Hiermee zijn de verouderde systemen indirect ook "unlocked" voor het internet.
Informatie Technologie vs. Operationeel Technology
In earlier days, ICS where standalone systems and protocols were most of the time proprietary. There was less ICS security awareness needed. Because these protocols were hard to understand, but more important because systems were never, or almost never connected to the internet. The last years, more and more ICS are internet ready and also actually connected to the internet. With this, the old systems are indirectly also unlocked to the internet. Information Technology vs. Operational Technology |
• In procesautomatisering van oudsher veel nadruk op fysieke (toegangs)beveiliging. (Toegangscontrole is ook digitaal) *
• Koppeling OT - IT (kantooromgeving) geeft verhoogde kans op cybersecurity risico’s *
• Groeiend aantal verbindingen / connecties doet complexiteit toenemen
• Risico procesautomatisering is risico IT plus risico OT (optelsom risico’s)
• Menselijke factor is ook in OT omgevingen het grootste risico *
• Verschuiving Safety naar Security (kan ook safety mee gemoeid zijn)
Binnen de industrie is het personeelstekort het grootst bij bedrijven die werkzaam zijn in de machine-industrie en de reparatie en installatie van machines.
Als hackers toegang krijgen tot dergelijke systemen kunnen ze mogelijk controle krijgen over kritieke infrastructuur, zoals de bediening van bruggen en sluizen.